

The Origins of the Java War (1825-30)

The 'Java War' (1825-30) was a watershed in the history of Java and of all Indonesia. For the first time the colonial government faced a social rebellion covering a large part of the island: most of Central and East Java and many of the *pasisir* (north coast) areas were affected. Two million Javanese, or one third of the total population, were exposed to the ravages of war, one fourth of the cultivated area of Java sustained damage and about 200,000 Javanese died.¹ The Dutch also suffered: 8,000 European troops and 7,000 Indonesian soldiers who fought for the Dutch were killed and the war cost the Dutch exchequer about 20 million guilders.² The end of the war left the Dutch in undisputed control of Java and a new phase of colonial rule began with the inception of Johannes van den Bosch's 'Culture System' (1830-48). The war thus marked the end of a process, maturing since the period of Daendels (1808-11): the change from the 'trading' era of the Dutch East India Company, when contacts with the central Javanese kingdoms had had the nature of ambassadorial links, to the 'colonial' period when the kingdoms occupied a subordinate position to the Dutch. For the Javanese the war was important for other reasons too: for perhaps the first time a rebellion had broken out at one of the central Javanese *Keratons* (courts) primarily over social and economic problems rather than merely dynastic ones. The emergence of a strong charismatic leader in the person of *pangeran* (prince) Dipanagara, who posed as the Javanese messianic 'just king' (*ratu adil*), served to bring many disparate social elements under a common banner. Widespread millenarian expectations caught the imagination of the peasantry and acted as a catalyst for social and economic grievances, accumulating since the beginning of the century. The concept of *prang sabil* (holy war), imagery from the Javanese *wayang* (shadow puppet theatre) and nativistic sentiments, made up of an intense longing for the restoration of an idealized traditional order, all helped to forge a common identity amongst Dipanagara's followers, bringing together nobles, dismissed provincial officials, religious teachers, professional bandits (*wong durjana*), porters (*baturs*), day labourers (*bujangs*), farmers and artisans. The Java War was thus of immense significance, for the subtle interplay of economic grievances and millenarian hopes created a movement of unique social breadth. ³

Its origins must be sought in the history of the Yogyakarta sultanate, which had been established in 1755 after the successful rebellion of *pangeran* Mangkubumi against the *sunan* of Surakarta and the Dutch. The kingdom was founded on military conquest and always retained something of the martial and energetic character of its first ruler, unlike Surakarta which was characterized by its more suave and effete court life.⁴ The reality of the division of central and east Java between Yogyakarta and the two Surakarta kingdoms, the Mangkunagaran and Kasunanan, came to be accepted as a permanent feature of Javanese politics. The relationship with the Dutch East India Company, which controlled West Java and the *pasisir*, was also regularized. Mangkubumi understood the incipient weaknesses of the Dutch, but, instead of openly challenging them, he played a shrewd waiting game: protesting whenever his position seemed in danger of being undermined by the Dutch or his Surakarta rivals, and nurturing the hope that the East India Company would collapse of its own accord because of its financial and military difficulties. Then he could reunite central and east Java under Yogyakarta hegemony. By the time Mangkubumi died in 1792, Yogyakarta had become established as a prosperous and militarily redoubtable state in central Java, overshadowing its rivals in

Surakarta. Secondly, the reality of the division of central and east Java had been accepted *faute de mieux* as an expression of political necessity for it maintained an equilibrium and curbed the ambitions of individual rulers. Finally, the presence of the Dutch in Java had been rationalized on the basis of the old division of the island between the Sundanese speaking west and the Javanese linguistic region of the centre and east.⁵ The situation in 1792 seemed favourable for Yogyakarta, but the maintenance of this position depended on two factors: the character of the sultan and the state of the Dutch government. If the former carried on the prescient policies of the first sultan with regard to the Dutch and if the latter remained weak, Yogyakarta was bound to prosper.

Unfortunately, neither of these conditions were fulfilled. Almost immediately after ascending the throne, the second sultan began to reverse his father's policies: within a decade (1792-1800) most of Mangkubumi's advisers had been dismissed and replaced by younger men, favourites of the new ruler and governmentally inexperienced. Within the *kraton* intrigues, maturing since the end of the previous reign, began to develop in a dangerous fashion; in particular between the sultan's brother, *pangeran* Natakusuma, and the Sultan's sons. The latter were supported by the sultan's three principal wives (*ratus*), who each hoped to see her own male offspring recognized as crown prince. The sultan himself proved a vain and ineffective ruler and retired for long periods to his hunting lodges (*pěsanggrahans*) in villages around Yogyakarta.⁶ The style of his administration was also harsh and haphazard: taxation returns increased sixfold, and although this to some extent reflected prosperity and a growing population, much was extorted unscrupulously. In 1799, for example, the sultan ordered that the measurement for each *cacah* (unit) of land should be decreased whilst maintaining the old taxation levels. Extensive building projects and the construction of new *pěsanggrahans* also increased the amount of *corvée* labour demanded from the inhabitants of the outlying provinces (*mancanagara*).⁷ Meanwhile, the sultan's nonchalant attitude towards the Dutch representatives at his court was immediately remarked upon: 'you will find the Sultan a man capricious, proud and arbitrary', wrote one Dutch resident.⁸ This arrogant approach to the Dutch was probably based on the sultan's understanding of the chronic weakness of the Dutch East India Company, but it was not a policy which augured well for the period of Daendels and Raffles (1811-16) when great powers of flexibility and astuteness were to be called for. It was unlucky for the central Javanese courts that just at the moment when the Dutch appeared weakest, revolutionary events were occurring in Europe which heralded a new era of colonialism. Yogyakarta's prosperous position also laid it open to the envy of the Surakarta courts, especially the *Kasunan*, which tried to embroil the sultan in conflict with the European government in order to destroy his kingdom.

In July 1808 Daendels promulgated a celebrated decree on *ceremonial and etiquette* which radically altered the position of the Dutch representatives at the courts and struck at the basis of the Javanese political philosophy whereby the sovereignty of Java had been divided between the Javanese kingdoms of the centre and east and the foreign controlled area of the west. Henceforth, the Dutch residents were to bear the title of 'minister', an appellation Daendels considered more appropriate to their position as representatives of King Louis of Holland. Likewise, in numerous small points of etiquette they were to be received as the equals of the Javanese rulers.⁹ In themselves the changes were minor, but to the rulers they signified a fundamental alteration in the position of the European government towards the courts. After the decree there could no longer be any pretension that the Dutch residents were mere ambassadors,

representing an equal sovereign state in west Java. The European government was now clearly laying claim to sovereignty in the Javanese parts of the island, areas which had always been considered the preserve of the Javanese rulers. The reaction to this decree at the courts was varied. In Surakarta the sunan seemingly acquiesced to the decision, but the sultan immediately indicated his displeasure, especially about the seating arrangements which placed the resident on his level and was viewed as an affront to the sultan's dignity. A state of muted hostility developed between the Yogyakarta court and Daendels, which was exacerbated by border incidents in the *pasisir*. Although Daendels visited the sultan in July 1809, no understanding was reached and contacts were strained further when the former sought to impose a monopoly of teak extraction which bore hard on the inhabitants of the eastern *mancanagara* regions.¹⁰ In November 1810 a revolt led by the senior administrator of the eastern *mancanagara*, Raden Rangga Prawiradirja, a brother-in-law of the sultan broke out in Yogyakarta against Daendels. Local issues in the eastern provinces precipitated this, but Rangga also enjoyed the tacit support of many in Yogyakarta including the sultan. Millenarian hopes were aroused by Rangga's adoption of the title of *Susuhunan Prabu Ingalaga* (His Highness the King, Ruler in battle), his proclamation of himself as the protector of the Chinese and Javanese and his decision to fight near the river *Kétangga*, which was always associated in Javanese eyes with the kingdom of the *ratu adil*.¹¹

The revolt was easily crushed by Daendels and Rangga himself was killed. The incident, nevertheless, illustrated the resentment against European government in Yogyakarta and the crucial role of millenarianism in arousing countrywide support. It was thus an important forerunner for Dipanagara's rebellion in 1825. Furthermore, Daendels's harsh reprisals deepened the antagonism felt at the courts towards the European government. On 31 December 1810, the sultan was forced to resign the administration of Yogyakarta in favour of his son, who was to rule as prince regent. Nearly half a million guilders were also demanded as prize money for Daendels's troops. Finally, in 1811 new treaties imposed on the courts annexed extensive regions to the central government and ended the annual *strandgeld* payments (rent for the north coast littoral) which had hitherto been paid to the Javanese rulers by the Dutch as a token of their erstwhile sovereignty in the *pasisir*. The sum was not large, but the ending of *strandgeld* removed one of the major reasons for the Javanese toleration of a European presence on the north coast, and the loss of control over the graves of royal ancestors and *walis* (apostles of Islam) was bitterly resented.¹²

Daendels's period of office as governor-general thus left a legacy of political unrest, especially in Yogyakarta where the old sultan remained in the *kraton* despite the fact that the administration was now in the hands of his son. The exile of the sultan's brother, *pangeran* Natakusuma, and his son, by Daendels particularly aggrieved the old ruler and led to suspicion of the prince regent and the young chancellor, *patih* Danurēja II (1799-1811), who were believed to have denounced them to the Dutch.¹³ In May 1811 a new governor-general, Jan Willem Janssens, began to liberalize many of the harsher aspects of his predecessor's rule, but his period of office was soon overshadowed by the British expedition against Java, whose object was the neutralization of the island as a French base in the Indian Ocean. This was successfully executed by British Indian and Sepoy troops in August and September. The swift humiliation of the Franco-Dutch government, the vague British promises to the courts and the vacuum left by Janssens's defeat all encouraged the central Javanese rulers to hope for a return to the old pre-Daendels political system. The sultan seized the chance

to take his revenge for recent humiliations by harassing the Dutch resident, murdering the *patih* and relieving his son of his administrative duties.¹⁴

The sultan's palace revolution was accepted grudgingly by the new British resident, John Crawfurd, in November, but in reports to the lieutenant-governor, Thomas Stamford Raffles, he indicated his strong preference for the crown prince as opposed to his father.¹⁵ Raffles, however, did not consider that he was militarily strong enough to pursue a forceful policy towards the courts. On his first visit to central Java in December 1811 he signed treaties with the rulers abrogating Daendels's recent territorial annexations. Many of the pettier aspects of Daendels's decree on etiquette were also allowed to lapse.¹⁶ Raffles's accommodating attitude was construed as fear by the sultan and military preparations were immediately embarked on in Yogyakarta to win further concessions. In particular, the old ruler hoped to secure the elimination of his son, the crown prince, because of his previous acceptance of authority under Daendels. Simultaneously, a secret correspondence was maintained with Surakarta in order to coordinate resistance in the event of a British attack. Raffles had, however, established a useful ally in the Yogyakarta *kraton* in the shape of Natakusuma whom he had returned to the court together with his son in December. The latter, although hostile to the crown prince, kept the British government in touch with developments in Yogyakarta. By April 1812 it was clear to Raffles that an expedition against the sultan could not long be delayed for the crown prince's life was in imminent danger and the secret entente between the courts was already surmised.¹⁷ Accordingly, Raffles and a British expeditionary force arrived in Yogyakarta, and, as the sultan refused to parley, the *kraton* was taken by assault (19-20 June). The sultan himself and his relations were taken prisoner in humiliating circumstances after they had attempted to sue for peace.¹⁸ The secret understanding with the susuhunan was of little avail, for the Surakarta ruler merely placed his troops across the British lines of communication and awaited the outcome of events in Yogya.¹⁹ On 22 June, the crown prince was appointed as the third sultan in his father's place and the latter was sent away to exile in Pulau Pinang.²⁰ The *kraton* itself was plundered by the British and many valuables and manuscripts were taken, amongst them most of the contents of the sultan's library comprising many important *babads* (Javanese historical chronicles) and land registers of Yogyakarta appanage holdings.²¹ At the same time, large sums of money from the *kraton* treasury appear to have been appropriated by Raffles.²²

On 1 August 1812 new treaties were ratified allowing for the annexation of various *mancanagara* provinces including the rich appanage area of *Kědhu*. The administration of the *bandars* (tollgates) and *pasars* (markets) were taken over by the British government and henceforth it was stipulated that all legal cases between Javanese born in the princely territories and foreigners or Javanese from other areas should be dealt with in the resident's court under British common law.²³ Surakarta was made to suffer equally with Yogyakarta regarding land annexations because of the discovery of the secret correspondence during the sack of the *kraton*.²⁴ But Yogyakarta suffered more severely because no military expedition was undertaken against the sunan. Furthermore, Raffles effectively divided the loyalties of the sultan's court by recognizing Natakusuma as an independent prince (1813) with the title of Paku Alam, answerable directly to the European government and disposing of a small force to aid the resident.²⁵ The fall of the Yogyakarta *kraton* and the subsequent treaties imposed on the courts marked an important stage in the process whereby the central Javanese

courts were turned into mere puppet kingdoms dependent on the European government.

At the same time, it helped to set the scene for the outbreak of the Java War, for the four years which culminated in the fall of Yogyakarta had created much bitterness amongst the Javanese nobles and officials and had led to the loss of their land and positions as a result of the territorial annexations.²⁶ The depletion of the sultan's treasury likewise hastened the impoverishment of all those who depended on the *kraton* for their livelihood. The humiliation of Yogyakarta was also undoubtedly felt at a very deep psychological level by most Yogyanese. In Javanese history such an event had usually signified the defilement of the *kraton* and an attaint to its magical power which necessitated the removal of the site of the court.²⁷ There seems to have been no attempt to do this in 1812, probably because of financial and territorial considerations, but the sense of unease and disappointment persisted. Thus there are references in Javanese sources that some held the view that the *cahya* (charisma) of the *kraton* had been severely tarnished and the third sultan is described as having felt the sultanate's humiliation particularly keenly.²⁸ Later, letters written by Yogyakarta nobles to the second sultan after his restoration during the Java War all dwell on the sense of sorrow experienced by them in 1812.²⁹ Such feelings put into perspective Dipanagara's efforts in the early stages of the Java War to bring about the final destruction of the Yogyakarta *kraton* and to establish a new undefiled *kraton* at another site.³⁰ The desire for moral regeneration thus became a crucial issue in the years preceding the Java War and partly explains why so many Yogya nobles rallied to Dipanagara.

At first, the period of the third sultan's rule (1812-14) held out some hopes for financial and governmental improvement in Yogyakarta. Economies were imposed on the court and to lighten the farmers' burdens it was envisaged that all taxes should be rendered in kind or corvée services rather than money.³¹ The extensive construction plans of the second sultan were discontinued and the annual gratuity of 100,000 Spanish dollars from the British for the rent of the *bandars* and *pasars* ensured the regular payment of *kraton* salaries.³² The relationship with the European government likewise improved thanks to the understanding between the sultan and the resident, John Crawfurd, who had acquired a knowledge of Javanese and was keenly interested in all aspects of Javanese culture and history.³³ Unfortunately, the third sultan's reign was too short to have much effect. He died suddenly on 3 November 1814 after a short illness and was succeeded by his son by an official wife, Raden Mas Sudama.³⁴ The latter was still a minor and ruled with the help of guardians until 1820. At first Paku Alam served as regent with full control over the royal exchequer, but he misused his position for personal enrichment and became so unpopular that the regency devolved on the sultan's mother, *ratu Ibu*, and the chancellor, *patih* Danurĕja IV (1813-47), who ran the administration. The *patih* was a man of Balinese descent from a famous seventeenthcentury adventurer Untung Surapati, and owed his position to the good offices of the third sultan and Dipanagara.³⁵ As he did not stem from an old established *priyayi* (official) family, he was something of an outsider in Yogyakarta *kraton* circles and sided with the European government in order to advance his career. Within the *kraton* he exercised some ascendancy over the *ratu Ibu* and Major Wiranagara, the commander of the sultan's bodyguard, who, like the *patih*, was of Balinese ancestry.³⁶ These three had begun to form a powerful clique in Yogyakarta by the time Java was handed back to the Dutch in August 1816 for the young sultan himself was too inexperienced to act independently and was easily influenced.

The main critic of this court clique was *pangeran* Dipanagara. He was the eldest son of the third sultan by an unofficial wife and had been born in 1785. Most of his childhood and adolescence had been spent at Těgalrěja, his great-grandmother's estate some miles from the royal capital. There he had enjoyed an unusual education and upbringing, mixing freely with prominent local religious teachers and *santris* (students of religion). He also had contacts with the religious hierarchy in Yogyakarta, in particular the members of the *suranatan* corps, who served as court chaplains to the sultan.³⁷ In his youth, unlike other young Yogyakarta nobles, Dipanagara had appeared rarely at the *kraton* and then only for the *garěbėgs*, the twice yearly Islamic feasts. Instead, he had devoted much of his time to religious study and meditation, also visiting some of the prominent shrines and holy places associated with the Mataram dynasty, the dynasty of the rulers of central Java.³⁸ After his great-grandmother's death in 1803, he had inherited Těgalrěja and lived there until the outbreak of the Java War. He proved himself a capable estate owner, shrewd in financial matters, yet alive to the needs of his tenants and prepared to make substantial improvements on his lands.³⁹ Dipanagara's upbringing and life style set him apart from his contemporaries in the *kraton*, for he was well read in Islamic theology, especially excelling in his knowledge of *fiqh* (Islamic law). His character also mirrored some of the attributes of his great-grandmother, a singularly devout and perceptive woman. During the troubles of 1808-12, Dipanagara had often given his father advice and had hoped to mediate a settlement with the second sultan. This had proved impossible, but throughout his father's brief reign he had afforded him help in administrative matters. It was on Dipanagara's advice that plans were made to restrict the activities of the *gunungs* (country tax-collectors) and to have the money taxes commuted to payments in kind and labour.⁴⁰ He had likewise played a part in the appointment of officials, among them Danurěja IV. In 1814 Dipanagara had married the orphaned daughter of Raden Rangga, thus linking himself closely with the family of the famous Yogyakarta rebel of 1810 whose exploits against Daendels he had greatly admired.⁴¹

By the time of his father's death, Dipanagara occupied an influential position in the *kraton* as a senior *pangeran* with wide administrative experience and as an elder brother of the sultan. Although he resided at Těgalrěja and devoted much of his time to his religious duties, Dipanagara still sought to guide the fourth sultan's education by prescribing him texts on statecraft and Javanese literature.⁴² His stern personality evoked a mixture of fear and respect in the *kraton*, but his relations with the clique around the *ratu Ibu* were strained; before the British attack in 1812 there had been talk that Dipanagara should be appointed as crown prince in the event of his father's accession. The suggestion probably originated with either Raffles or Crawford, who, unaware of the Javanese distinction between sons of official (*garwa padmi*) and unofficial (*selir*) wives, had presumed that Dipanagara as the eldest son should be offered the position. Dipanagara had immediately declined the offer, both because he knew his brother had more right to it and also because he did not covet temporal power in Yogya. But rumours persisted that he harboured secret ambitions for the sultanate and these were kept alive by Dipanagara's favoured position as his father's confidant and his later criticism of the *ratu Ibu* and her faction.⁴³

The *kraton* during the fourth sultan's minority thus contained latent tensions: on the one hand there was the almost universal dislike of Paku Alam and on the other there was the fear of those around the *ratu Ibu* for Dipanagara's influence and prestige. Danurěja, in particular, resented the *pangeran's* earlier patronage of him and

Dipanagara for his part disapproved of the *patih's* corrupt and self-interested style of administration.⁴⁴ During Crawford's residency (1811-14/1816), these tensions were kept in abeyance, but relationships became seriously strained in August 1816 when Nahuys van Burgst replaced Crawford after Java had been handed back to the Netherlands. Nahuys was a capable official with some experience of Javanese affairs, who had powerful connections in Dutch government circles.⁴⁵ In terms of colonial policy he was a 'liberal' (i.e. an advocate of the use of private western capital) and sought to put his economic and political ideas into practice by renting land in the princely territories for himself and his friends. Earlier, only very small plots of land had been leased by the independent rulers to Europeans as vegetable gardens or country retreats and then only for short periods, but the decision of the Dutch governor-general, G. A. G. Ph. van der Capellen (1816-26), to restrict privately owned European estates in areas under European government control led to a move by Nahuys and others to secure leases from the independent rulers. In Yogyakarta, the new Dutch resident thus began to work through the *ratu Ibu* and her supporters to rent land directly from the young sultan. 'The guardians of the fourth sultan readily co-operated for their own pecuniary advantage. By the time Nahuys retired as resident of Yogyakarta in 1822, no less than 115 separate villages and plots of land had been rented out to Europeans and Chinese in the Yogya area and a further 166 villages and plots in Surakarta.⁴⁶

For the most part these holdings were used for the production for the European market of cash crops such as sugar, coffee, indigo and pepper. The rapid extension of the land rent in the princely territories, nevertheless, had important consequences. Many Javanese nobles and officials seized on the land rent as a way of recouping the losses they had suffered during the land annexations of 1808-12, for it provided them with a steady income and relieved them of the necessity of personal administration. But the renunciation of personal supervision meant that the old paternalistic link between the Javanese noble and his tenants was sometimes broken and the rents themselves were used not for capital improvement but for the purchase of luxury goods imported from Europe. After 1816 there was an increase in the consumption of strong drink and the use of European furniture, carriages and card games amongst the Javanese nobility. In Surakarta, *pangeran* Ngabehi, a son of Pakubuwana IV, furnished part of his *dalëm* (residence) in Dutch seventeenth-century style and at a party given there a European guest noticed that his host drunk by himself 'a full decanter of Madeira besides occasional glasses of beer and claret for varieties sake'.⁴⁷ This was perhaps a rather extreme case but though Yogyakarta remained more traditional, even here there were changes in style. The fourth sultan, probably at Nahuys's instigation, dressed some of his bodyguard in European uniforms and the sultan himself enjoyed wearing the outfit of a Dutch major-general on sorties outside the *kraton*.⁴⁸ This tangible evidence of European social and economic influence was resented by Dipanagara, who was a staunch conservative in matters affecting Javanese *adat* (custom). In particular, Dipanagara noticed how the bluff, extroverted character of Nahuys formed a contrast with that of Crawford and in his *babad* (autobiographical chronicle) he dismissed the Dutchman laconically in one sentence as 'a resident who merely enjoyed eating and drinking and the spreading of Dutch ways.'⁴⁹ The whole question of the land rent and Nahuys's use of his position of influence with the young sultan led to a marked deterioration in the relations between Dipanagara and the court clique. Even more important than the changes wrought by the land rent on the life style of the members of the *kratons*, was its impact on the village communities, for the leases to Europeans and

Chinese not only entailed the alienation of land, but in most cases, the inhabitants who lived on the land. These were sometimes forcibly conscripted to work as wage labourers, and, although some may have welcomed the opportunity, many resented the intrusion into their customary village life. This was the case with eighteen Javanese families who were moved from their villages to work on Nahuys's coffee estate at Bědaya on the flanks of Mt Měrapı; they were unable to lodge a formal protest with the sultan, because the latter had permitted the supply of labour, but they made their feelings known by complaints to friends and relations.⁵⁰ Such effects of the land rent were cumulatively considerable; villages were split up and local *adat* disregarded for the sake of European estate owners who neither spoke Javanese nor understood Javanese ways. Meanwhile, the juxtaposition of cash crops on the estates with the *sawahs* (ricefields) of the neighbouring villagers also created problems.⁵¹ The bitterness, which was generated in the countryside by the haphazard allocation of the land rent, resulted in attacks on isolated estates by local estate workers and vagrants (*wong durjana*): one Dutch estate owner, whose lands were the butt of particularly frequent incursions, even being forced to apply for a special allocation of gunpowder from the government for purposes of defence.⁵²

The agrarian situation in central Java was further aggravated by the introduction of Raffles's system of land tax in some areas. This system was regarded as being advantageous for the local population since it was hoped that it would relieve them of corvée and forced dues in return for a single fairly assessed money tax on the value of their holdings, which would leave them free to cultivate cash crops for the open market.⁵³ In practice, however, the tax was raised unfairly and unevenly on the local population in many areas because of the absence of a detailed cadastral survey. Furthermore, Raffles's hope that the tax should be rendered in cash rather than kind made difficulties for the Javanese peasants, who lived by a barter system rather than a money economy and were forced to rely on Chinese moneylenders to meet cash payments. At the same time, the abuses of the old Javanese system remained, for the land tax was nearly always collected by the local Javanese officials who insisted on traditional services. The situation in Kědhu, once the richest of the court appanage lands, became particularly desperate: in a report on the region in 1816, the Dutch resident observed that the hurried introduction of the land tax had resulted in a decline in production and even of population.⁵⁴ His observations were confirmed by a European planter who visited the region in 1821 and remarked on the terrible plight of the peasantry who were forced to sell their entire tobacco crop to pay the land tax and lived themselves on a meagre maize diet. 'Any excess profit is very rare for the Javanese peasant', he wrote, 'because, besides the high land tax, the Javanese tax collector plagues him and his greatest difficulty is his own Javanese chief... and he is lucky if he only has one. . .'.⁵⁵ Corruption and maladministration on the part of Javanese officials sometimes resulted in their dismissal and the years before the Java War saw a high turnover of officials in Kědhu, but this did not lead to any lasting change in local conditions. Conditions seem to have deteriorated sharply in 1821 because of the poor rice harvest and cholera epidemic of that year. By 1822 rice prices had reached an unprecedented peak of 5.50 guilders per piku/ (61-761 kgs) which may have precipitated a local revolt in southern Kědhu led by Dipanagara's great-uncle, *pangeran* Dipasana.⁵⁶ This was mainly directed against Dutch officials and local Chinese tollgate keepers and it sparked off another small uprising in the neighbouring province of Bagělen.⁵⁷ Both risings were easily crushed by the resolute actions of Nahuys, but in some ways they can be regarded

as the forerunners of a far more widespread agrarian uprising in southern K dhu in July 1825, coinciding with Dipanagara's own revolt in Yogyakarta.

The administration of the tollgates by the European government after 1812 also contributed to unrest in the countryside. Between 1812 and 1824 the revenue received by the European government in the Yogyakarta area rose by over 700 per cent, representing a sum over five times in excess of the rent from a// the sultan's tax farms in 1811.⁵⁸ This staggering increase to some extent reflected an increase in internal commerce and prosperity, but for the most part it was the direct result of the European government's extraction of larger rents from the Chinese tax-farmers who in turn passed the increase on by raising the toll-dues and by various other unscrupulous methods. Tollgates were sub-farmed three or four times with each of the Chinese *bandars* taking a profit; and they became so numerous that however near a Javanese farmer might be to his market, he was forced to pass through one.⁵⁹ A government order of 1823 that toll rates should be published was not effective and the dues levied sometimes exceeded the value of the merchandise, especially if it consisted of fruit and vegetables. Often the farmer had to part with his goods to pay the dues and he was usually kept waiting for a long time before his load was inspected. If his buffaloes grazed on the *bandar's* land during this period, he was fined and if this fine could not be paid, his draught animals were impounded, so that at harvest time it was not uncommon for the Javanese farmer to surrender the bulk of the profits from his crop for the rent of his own animals from the local *bandar*.⁶⁰ Likewise, *bupatis* (provincial administrators) travelling from the provinces to render the twice yearly *mulud* and *puasa* taxes at the courts, were often searched bodily for articles of jewellery at the tollgates and sometimes had to use the tax returns from their districts to meet the numerous dues.⁶¹

Other monopolies and indirect taxes administered by the *bandars* also bore hard on the local inhabitants. In the towns, goldsmiths, silversmiths and copper workers paid yearly 'protection' money to the Chinese and every *gam lan* (Javanese orchestra) was taxed. Failure to meet such payments could result in arbitrary imprisonment for many Chinese *bandars* kept their own prisons and stocks.⁶² Copper coins imported from the north coast also paid heavy duty with the result that specie was more costly in the princely territories than in other areas. Such a high tax was paid on imported north coast salt, moreover, that this essential commodity was virtually unobtainable in some of the Yogyakarta eastern *mancanagara* provinces.⁶³ Gambling and opium, both government monopolies, thrived in Yogyakarta and Surakarta and the Chinese *bandars* presided over the gambling houses and opium dens in the *kraton* towns which made immense profits.⁶⁴ These monopolies were scourges which affected large sections of the Javanese population, especially the *bujangs* (landless labourers), who were reduced to a shiftless existence. On a visit to Kedhu in 1812, Crawford remarked on the condition of the porters (*batur*s) in the province stating that 'no sooner is their hire paid to them, than they may be seen sitting in groups to gamble it away and they are altogether so impoverished that they go nearly naked.'⁶⁵ Another contemporary described the members of the *gladhags*, the porters' guilds in the court towns, for the most part *bujangs* from the Javanese villages, who were corrupted by opium and games of chance, and in order to maintain themselves on their meagre wages (10 cents a day) would engage in robbery and violence.⁶⁶ Indeed, the strength of popular discontent aroused by the *bandars* can be gauged by the steady rise in the number of robberies and attacks on toll-gate keepers in the years before the Java War.⁶⁷

Locally-born Javanese also found it difficult to procure justice in cases involving the Chinese *bandars* for after 1814 all these cases were tried by the resident's court in Yogyakarta and after 1817 all tollgate disputes were referred to the *raad van justitie* (high court) at Semarang.⁶⁸ This led to lengthy and costly litigation conducted according to legal rules of which the Javanese had no understanding. Later, Dipanagara particularly singled out the decision to try such cases under European law as one of the most unfortunate aspects of European influence in the princely territories during this period.⁶⁹ The grievousness of the situation with regard to the tollgates was also summed up by the Surakarta resident, H. MacGillavry (1823-4/1825-7), who wrote that 'the Chinese are our work tools, and although each year we (the European government) may rejoice over the increase in taxation on the assumption that this is based on increased prosperity, we are in fact only grinding the iron yoke further into their shoulders . . . for a million guilders a year worth of taxes we sacrifice the welfare and happiness of over two million inhabitants, who are not immediately under our protection, but whose welfare is so clearly dependant upon us.'⁷⁰

The deepening of the social and economic grievances in central Java on the eve of the Java War was paralleled on a political level by events in Yogyakarta. On 9 December 1822 the fourth sultan died suddenly of a fit and the crown prince, a child of three, was appointed as his successor. The guardianship was entrusted to the *ratu Ibu* and the sultan's mother, *ratu Kencana*, together with Dipanagara and the latter's uncle, *pangeran* Mangkubumi. These guardians, however, only had control of the financial affairs in the *kraton* and the administration of the sultan's lands remained in the hands of the *patih*, who continued to govern under the general supervision of the Dutch resident.⁷¹ Danurēja's scope for personal manipulation thus remained intact, and, as he still wielded great influence over the two *ratus*, he was soon able to cut out Dipanagara and his uncle from effective power in the councils of state. Moreover, the suddenness of the fourth sultan's death coupled with the mysterious nature of his illness, led to rumours that he had been poisoned and court gossip implicated Dipanagara.⁷² The old fears about Dipanagara's ambitions were revived and relations between the prince and the court group became more acrimonious. The deliberate failure of the *patih* to inform him about his nephew's coronation hurt Dipanagara's feelings and in his *babad*, he dwelt on his sense of impotence at being made a guardian of the child sultan.⁷³ The violent eruption of Mt Merapi, the volcano overlooking Yogyakarta, on 28-30 December, just over a week after the coronation ceremony, seemed to him to be a portent of coming change and cataclysmic events.⁷⁴ At this tense moment in Yogyakarta history, a weak and ineffectual official, A. H. Smissaert, the erstwhile resident of Rĕmbang, was appointed resident. Smissaert had been given the Yogyakarta post as a means of supplementing his income before he retired to take up his pension in Holland.⁷⁵ Nearly all the contemporary sources characterized him as a man of very mediocre talents and his rather unprepossessing appearance (he was bald, short and fat) created an unfortunate impression in Javanese court society in which great importance was attached to the bearing and physiognomy of Dutch officials.⁷⁶ Furthermore, Smissaert assumed control in Yogyakarta (11 February 1823) just as the governor-general was about to implement his decision to end the land rent in the princely states.

Van der Capellen had long been concerned about its effects in central Java. His journeys to the courts in 1819 and 1822 had convinced him that the indiscriminate renting of land and village labour to European planters in areas outside the immediate jurisdiction of the European government should be ended.⁷⁷ He also envisaged that the

principalities should be incorporated under the direct rule of the European government and in a small gathering of Surakarta notables in 1822, he had aired the view that the inhabitants of the sunan and the sultan would be better off under Dutch rule.⁷⁸ He made this statement with the best intentions, although such a bland remark was hardly tactful in front of prominent representatives of the Surakarta court, for whom the annexations of Daendels and Raffles were still fresh memories. Nevertheless, despite the political drawbacks, it was clear that van der Capellen hoped that this aim could be achieved without violent opposition. So, in order to pave the way for the government annexation of the principalities, he published a decision of 6 May 1823 that all lands rented by Europeans and Chinese in Yogyakarta and Surakarta should be returned to their owners not later than 31 January 1824.⁷⁹ This abrupt and radical decision aroused mixed feelings at the courts. In Surakarta, *pangeran* Buminata wrote to Nahuys van Burgst to protest against the governor-general's resolution, but in Yogyakarta *pangeran* Mangkubumi described the reaction in the *kraton* thus: 'everyone was pleased about it; it was as if we had been sprinkled with water. We had been hot and (now) we would be cooled.'⁸⁰ Such feelings of euphoria were soon dashed, however, by the realities of financial compensation to the planters. Here, Yogyakarta was more heavily burdened than Surakarta, for whereas estates in the latter kingdom were to be reimbursed according to the amount produced yearly by the plantations, in Yogyakarta direct payments had to be made out of the sultan's treasury.⁸¹ This led to an immediate impoverishment of the *kraton*: moveable goods and *pusakas* (heirlooms) were sold to meet daily requirements and sizeable sums were deducted from the yearly government stipend to the court to pay for reimbursements.⁸² The Yogyakarta nobility also suffered financial embarrassment for many had become dependent on the land rent for their livelihood, and the demands of the planters for compensation placed them in an invidious position. The lists of debts in Yogyakarta at this time indicate the extent of financial embarrassment of the members of the *kraton*; the case of a man such as *pangeran* Blitar, who had pawned all his *pusakas* and jewelry for a monthly interest rate of 110 Spanish dollars on a total monthly income of 80 Spanish dollars from his lands, could be regarded as typical of many of his contemporaries.⁸³ Such men naturally gravitated towards Dipanagara, who had earlier indicated his disapproval of the land rent and the *patih's* administration, although all were not in favour of outright rebellion.⁸⁴

Thanks to his special responsibilities for the *kraton's* finances, Dipanagara had to play a leading role in the negotiations about compensations. In July 1823 a dispute arose over the indemnity for Nahuys's old estate at *Bédaya*. Dipanagara refused to countenance the reimbursements of Nahuys's coffee and pepper estates pointing out that these would be of no use to the sultan and he only offered a small sum for the buildings. According to Mangkubumi, the guardians were cajoled by Smissaert into sealing a document, whose contents were unclear, which arranged for the reimbursement of 26,000 Spanish dollars out of the 40,000 originally demanded.⁸⁵ Later other cases of indemnification came up, notably for the lands at Rĕjawinangun leased by a Scotsman, Mr Thomson, but Dipanagara refused to participate in the negotiations and withdrew almost permanently to Tĕgalrĕja.⁸⁶ At the same time, other incidents occurred which led to a further deterioration of relations between Dipanagara and the *kraton* group. In September 1823, Dipanagara's friend, the *pĕngulu* (chief religious official) of Yogyakarta was dismissed by Danurĕja because he had refused to follow the *patih's* instructions in passing partial judgments in the *surambi* (religious court). He was replaced by a minor

mosque official without Dipanagara's advice being asked.⁸⁷ Simultaneously, another of Dipanagara's friends, Mas Tumenggung Kertadirja, the *bupati* of Sokawati, was forced to relinquish his post in a rigged trial in Yogyakarta and his place was taken by one of Danurĕja's relations.⁸⁸ Such incidents in which officials were prematurely dismissed were common during the period of the *patih's* administration and a Surakarta *babad* account gives a graphic description of the situation in Yogyakarta at this time:

I.

7. ... All the *nayakas* (chief advisers) in Yogya together without scruple followed their own wishes just as they pleased. Many of their orders were not authorized, numerous old customs were abrogated (and) the common people were bewildered. There were changes in the direction of the state (and) there was much calumny. Bandits, highwaymen, robbers and thieves could move about in the kingdom.
8. The law of the *surambi* was not enforced and the administration by the *pradata* (civil court) was fitful. All the essential elements of the law were disregarded. Arbitrariness prevailed and those in authority acted strongly and in an unsuitable (and) unmannerly fashion. Many people were dismissed by ruses (and) in the councils other men took their places, descendants of common people.
9. Often foodstuffs were scarce and unwholesome. Many common people fled to other villages and towns as they wished. Much of their attachment for the state and their king disappeared. The *ricinus* (castor-oil) plant sprang up (but) the teak tree died so to speak, for staid people and gentry were ousted by intruding upstarts.⁸⁹

The description is couched in traditional Javanese terms, but it almost certainly reflects the grievous contemporary conditions in Yogyakarta.

I. LOr 2114, I (Dhandhanggula), p. 2;

7. ... sagung para nayaka Ngayogya samya dhadhangan karsane sasuka-sukanipun keh parentah datan pawit adat lawas keh rusak kang wong cilik bingung owah keblating nagara keh pitĕnah kampak begal kecu maling ngambah sajroning praja
8. tan lumampah chukuming surambi nora ajĕg adiling pradata rukun-rukun ilang kabeh ikhtiyar kang lumaku myang wasesa rosa mĕksih saru dĕksura nora pinikir dĕlarung akeh wong pocot rineka ing bicara wong liya ingkang gĕnteni anak wijil wong kumpra
9. kĕrĕp larang pangan myang gagĕring wong cilik keh ngungsi desa liyan miwah nagri sasukane keh ilang trĕsnanipun mring jagade lan ratuneki tunggak jarak marajak tunggak jati lampus iku kinarya upama denya ilang wadya nalar myang naluri sinĕlan wadya rucah

During this period, when the greatest tact was called for if the Dutch officials in Yogyakarta were to mollify the harsher aspects of Danurĕja's style of government and ease the negotiations over the compensations, the government representatives made things worse. Thus the assistant-resident, P. F.H. Chevallier and the interpreter, J.G. Dietrĕe, both co-operated closely with the *patih* and engaged in financial transactions such as the loaning of money to impoverished Javanese nobles at high rates of interest and the sale of court heirlooms and jewellery.⁹⁰ Moreover, in their personal relations, they indulged in actions gravely insulting to the Javanese sense of propriety, for both

men undertook clandestine affairs with ladies of the court, Dietrěe with a secondary wife of Mangkubumi and Chevallier with one of Dipanagara's *sělirs*.⁹¹ Naturally these activities were particularly resented by Dipanagara who later burst out in bitter reproaches against the Dutch officials of the time and their inability to speak anything but pasar (bazaar) Malay, describing how '... Chevallier and other Dutchmen had trotted into our Ara/on as if was a stable, and had shouted and called as though it had become a pasar'⁹² Smissaert, for his part behaved decorously, but he allowed himself to be influenced by the *patih* and spent too much of his time away from Yogyakarta at Nahuys's former country retreat at Bedaya.

The European government itself contributed greatly to the sense of unease and suspicion prevailing in the princely territories by pressing forward with plans for annexation. In a secret resolution of 9 September 1823 on the occasion of the appointment of Pakubuwana VI (1823-30) as sunan in Surakarta, van der Capellen reminded the Dutch residents at the courts of his intentions to incorporate Yogyakarta and Surakarta under direct government control. He suggested that the residents should prepare the way for complete annexation by helping to take over areas distant from the *#ratons*, which bordered on government territory.⁹³ On 1 1825 various small provinces belonging to the courts adjacent to the north coast residencies of Sěmarang, Pěkalongan and Kědhu were thus taken over by the government for a period of thirty years. The incorporation came at a time when Chevallier was conducting surveys of Banyumas and Bagelen, western *mancanagara* provinces, which the government also intended to annex.⁹⁴ These moves were regarded with deep misgivings on the part of many in the *Yogya kraton* and Smissaert wrote to the commissioner for the princely territories, urging him not to proceed to the annexation of the north coast provinces and to arrange for the immediate reimbursement of some of the land tax in the areas under government control in order to stave off widespread agrarian unrest.⁹⁵

Smissaert's warning came too late to have any effect. The grievances in the countryside and the embitterment of the members of the *kratons* were too deep-seated for any temporary reforms to have much effect. Already events in Yogyakarta were moving towards open rebellion. In May 1825 Dipanagara began to remit *puasa* taxes in order that his tenants could purchase arms and supplies for the coming conflict, which many people expected to break out in the following month of *Sura* (15 August-14 September 1825), the first month of the Javanese new year, when Dipanagara's forces planned to launch an attack on the *Yogyakarta kraton*.⁹⁶ At the same time, relations between Dipanagara and the Dutch officials reached breaking point when Chevallier publicly ridiculed Dipanagara in his absence at the celebration of the *garěběg puasa* (18 May 1825) in Yogyakarta.⁹⁷ At the end of May Smissaert took the decision to improve some of the side roads around the royal capital, one of which skirted the boundary of Dipanagara's estate at Těgalrěja.⁹⁸ Although the resident seems to have given Danurěja particular instructions to warn Dipanagara about his intentions to broaden the road, the *patih* carried out the construction in an intentionally tactless manner. This led to armed hostility between Dipanagara's retainers and Danurěja's men who had been detailed to stake out the road.⁹⁹ Meanwhile, tenants from the prince's lands which lay further away began to come to Těgalrěja to take part in the defence of Dipanagara's *dalěm*. News of preparations by one of Dipanagara's tenants near Surakarta reached the Surakarta resident, who informed Smissaert of the seriousness of the situation.¹⁰⁰ The latter, however, apparently remained oblivious of the impending danger. He did not return to Yogyakarta to begin negotiations until two days after he had received his

colleague's warning. From 18-20 July attempts were made both by Smissaert and Danurēja to invite Dipanagara for negotiations in Yogyakarta, but the prince refused to comply, and when Mangkubumi was despatched to Těgalrēja to win him over, he decided instead to make common cause with his nephew. Finally, on 20 July an expedition was sent to Těgalrēja under Chevallier's command to arrest the princes. There was fighting between the expedition and Dipanagara's supporters during which cavalry and cannon were used to scatter the Javanese. Although Těgalrēja itself was captured and burnt, Dipanagara and Mangkubumi were able to make good their escape across the rice fields with the majority of their followers. The following day (21 July 1825) they arrived at Sělarong, Dipanagara's estate in the limestone hills to the south-west of Yogyakarta. There, outside the cave where Dipanagara had so often meditated, they set up the standard of revolt. The Java War had begun. 101

The outbreak came when social and economic distress in other parts of Java had been exacerbated by a recurrence of the 1821 cholera epidemic and the failure of the harvest in some regions.¹⁰² In the province of Prabalingga in southern Kědhu (which had earlier been the scene of *pangeran* Dipasana's revolt in February 1822), the poor rice harvest caused prices to rise from the usual four guilders per *pikul* to over ten guilders. The resident of Kědhu reported that the whole province, numbering some 35,000 inhabitants, had gone over to Dipanagara and that attacks had been made on Europeans and Chinese. Later, the administrative capital of Kědhu, Magělang, came under siege and nearly fell to Dipanagara's forces during repeated attacks.¹⁰³ Some areas on the north coast, particularly Pěkalongan, were also disturbed by the recent annexations and there was much support for Dipanagara in the regions controlled by *pangeran* Serang, a descendant of the famous *wali* (apostle of Islam) Sunan Kalijaga.¹⁰⁴ In Surakarta, the court held itself in readiness to go over to Dipanagara if Dutch reinforcements were not forthcoming.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the southern regions of Gunung Kidul and Pacitan, both areas where government cultivations and monopolies were in force, rose under the leadership of the local *bupatis* against the Dutch inspectors of cultures and the Chinese *bandars*.¹⁰⁶ It was the same in the eastern *mancanagara* provinces where later in the year many Chinese tollgate keepers along the Sala river lost their lives.¹⁰⁷

It was in the Yogyakarta area, however, that the most widespread social rebellion took place against the Dutch and their supporters in the *kraton*. Besides Dipanagara's own retainers and tenants who had followed him to Sělarong, fifteen out of the remaining twenty-nine *pangerans* in Yogyakarta joined the prince together with many of the court *abdi-dalěms* (retainers) and members of the sultan's bodyguard.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, at various intervals throughout the war, forty-one out of Yogyakarta's eighty-eight *bupatis* whose loyalty is known, rallied to Dipanagara. Many of these provincial administrators had lost their positions or suffered a diminution in their landholdings because of the various government annexations.¹⁰⁹ These, together with the Yogyakarta nobility who came to Sělarong, were given new titles and were ordered to organize support for Dipanagara in their own localities. Likewise, many of the Yogyakarta religious hierarchy, including the recently appointed pěngulu, gave Dipanagara their support.¹¹⁰ Numerous religious teachers from the *pondhoks* and *pěsantrėns* (small and large religious schools) and from the *pardikan* (tax free) areas also afforded the prince their advice and help in the early months of the war. Prominent amongst these religious teachers was Kyai Maja from the *pardikan* village of Maja in the Surakarta area, but there were also many other less famous *ulamas* (legal experts), *hajis* (returned Mecca pilgrims) and *kyais* (religious teachers/ revered country gentlemen) who used their

influence in their own villages to raise support for Dipanagara. In this respect, Dipanagara's rather unusual position as a Yogyakarta *pangeran* with wide contacts amongst the religious communities stood him in good stead. The war itself, which took on the aspect of a religious crusade (*prang sabil*) against all foreigners and unbelievers in Java, also greatly enhanced the importance of the members of the religious groups as Dipanagara's advisers. Amongst Dipanagara's supporters in the village areas were seventy-eight *démangs* (village officials) of the sultan's lands in Mataram as well as various bands of *wong durjana* (vagrants) who operated under Dipanagara's command and were placed under their own chiefs.¹¹¹ Mass support for the prince was provided by the villagers themselves, mobilized by their own local officials and nobility. Most were armed in a rudimentary fashion with slings and sharpened bamboo stakes, but some were co-opted into Dipanagara's elite bodyguard regiments such as the *bulkios*, *turkios* and *arkios* which were modelled on the Janissary regiments of the Ottoman sultans.¹¹² Besides the concept of the *prang sabil*, the factor which most enhanced Dipanagara's position as the leader of the disparate social elements which made up his following was the popular belief that he was the *ratu adil*, the "just king" who would institute an age of justice and plenty after a period of decline.¹¹³ This belief, which probably derived from the Hindu *kali-yuga* cycle, seems to have had a long history in Java and was certainly a widely held notion at the time of the Java War.¹¹⁴ In particular, Dipanagara's assumption of the title of *Erucakra*, which is a name of the *ratu adil*, when he was at Sëlaronng on 1 Sura A.J. 1753 (15 August 1825), clearly indicated that the prince saw himself as fulfilling the role of the 'just king', a role for which Dipanagara's meditative and charismatic personality was admirably suited. He was thus able to inspire loyalty and affection amongst the population of central and east Java even though many of his followers had never come into personal contact with him. Another aspect of the *ratu adil* which appealed especially to the religious communities (and was fostered by Dipanagara) was the view that the prince would establish himself as the regulator of religion in Java (*rafu panètèg panatagama*) much in the same fashion as the *walis* were believed to have exercised authority in religious affairs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.¹¹⁵ Dipanagara himself encouraged this belief by referring often to his aim of 'raising up the high state of the Islamic religion in Java' in his letters to his army commanders (*basahs*).¹¹⁶ Later, during the final peace negotiations in March 1830 at Magëlang, Dipanagara demanded that he should be recognized as an independent prince in central Java with authority to intervene in the internal religious affairs of other local rulers.¹¹⁷ These religious aims did not mean, however, that Dipanagara saw himself, or indeed was seen by his supporters, in a rigorously orthodox fashion as a sort of *Imam Mahdi*. There were no direct Mahdistic influences in Java at the time, although the concept was known in some areas of west Java later in the nineteenth century.¹¹⁸ The inspiration for the *prang sabil* and the view of Dipanagara as the *ratu panètëg panatagama* stemmed rather from traditional Javanese beliefs such as the legends which surrounded the lives of the *walis* and the expectation that the *ratu adil* would wage a short purifying war of destruction before instituting the period of just rule.¹¹⁹ Another quintessentially Javanese aspect of the war which bulked large in the imaginations of many of the Javanese who took part in the war was the view of the struggle as a re-enactment of the *bratayuda*, the 'brothers' war' between Kurawas and Pandhawas in the famous Indian epic of the *Mahābhārata*, which had long been known about in Java through the medium of Old Javanese literature and contemporary *wayang* plays. This theme was of particular importance in providing justification in Javanese

terms for those who elected to join Dipanagara and for those Javanese who chose to fight against him.¹²⁰

In assessing the significance of the war for Javanese society and historical development two aspects seem to stand out: the essentially traditional aspirations of Dipanagara's followers and the impressive breadth of the social movement unleashed by contemporary millenarian expectations. Thus, on the one hand the Java War can be characterized as a deeply conservative event marking a turning inwards of Javanese society in the face of the social and economic realities of the colonial experience. This can be seen most vividly in the desire of all sections of Javanese society for the restoration of an idealized traditional order. Javanese nobles and officials who rallied to Dipanagara hoped principally to fulfil traditional ambitions such as an increase in their landholdings, the restoration of their old positions and the opportunity to make good marriages. In cultural terms there was also a conscious attempt to keep Javanese traditions intact: the Javanese language itself was sedulously used instead of Malay and even captured Dutch prisoners were forced to speak *krama* (high Javanese) when conversing with their captors.¹²¹ Despite the turbans and long white *jubahs* (tabards) adopted by Dipanagara's troops and the use of Arabic names and Turkish titles, in themselves a revival of old Javanese traditions concerning the sultanate of *Rum* (Turkey), the aristocratic nature of Dipanagara's military command and the ranks given to his family and followers all recalled the structure of the Javanese *kraton*. A conservative approach to religious affairs can be discerned too amongst Dipanagara's supporters and it is very significant that the most important religious figure in Dipanagara's entourage was not an Arab or a *haji*, but a Javanese *ulama*, Kyai Maja, who had been brought up on traditional methods of *Qur'an* exegesis and whose knowledge of the Holy Book was sufficient to overawe even those religious scholars who had spent long periods in Mecca.¹²² Finally, in political terms, the aims of Dipanagara and his followers from the *kraton* were plainly traditional. They hoped for a return to the political system which had been in force before the arrival of Daendels, when the Dutch had fulfilled the function of traders and their influence in central and east Java had been very limited. In his peace proposals, Dipanagara suggested that if the Dutch should decide to remain in Java, they should restrict themselves to trade and reside exclusively in the *pasisir* areas on the north coast and west Java.¹²³

Yet, on the other hand, the Java War contained the seeds of future developments. The coincidence to some extent of the social and economic grievances of the peasantry and the *kraton* communities had enabled the most diverse social elements to find common ground in opposing the Dutch. The great importance of charismatic leadership and millenarian hopes, both aspects of later Indonesian politics, had been clearly demonstrated. Although Dipanagara ultimately failed in his endeavours, the movement which he led against the colonial government was unique in its sheer size and social scope: as such it prefigured the breadth of the nationalist struggle in the twentieth century. The Java War thus throws light on the beginnings of Javanese self-awareness as a cohesive nation, a necessary step on the road to Indonesian nationhood.

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Footnotes

1. Bram Peper, 'Population Growth in Java in the 19th Century', *Population Studies*, xxiv, i (1971), 82; A(lgemeen) R(ijksarchief, The Hague), M(inisterie) v(an) K(oloniën) 3055, "Beschrijving en statistieke rapport betreffende de Residentie Djocjokarta' (1836) states that the population of Yogyakarta, Mataram and Gunung Kidul declined from 405,680 in 1825 to 198,156 in 1831.
2. H. J. de Graaf, *Geschiedenis van Indonesië* ('s-Gravenhage & Bandung, 1949), p. 399.
3. For bibliographical details on the Java War see M. C. Ricklefs, 'Dipnagara's Early Inspirational Experience', *Blijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van bet Koninklijk I(nstituut, Leiden)*, cxxx (1974), 227-8; and P.B.R. Carey, 'Javanese Histories of Dipnagara', *BKI*, cxxx (1974), 259-61.
4. H. Graaf van Hogendorp, *Willem van Hogendorp in Nederlandsch-Indië, 1827-1830* (s-Gravenhage, 1913), p. 141, mentioned W. van Hogendorp's impression of the two courts: '... this court (Surakarta) with its larger population is wasteful, voluptuous and effeminate, whereas that of Djocjo (Yogyakarta) is courageous, heroic and much more concerned with tradition. So much so indeed that I have noticed, in the middle of their dually controlled territories, where Solo (Surakarta) and Djocjo (Yogyakarta) land lie very close to each other, that a man from Djocjo (Yogyakarta) can be distinguished at first glance.'
5. West Java, where the Dutch had established themselves since the early seventeenth century, was not regarded as falling under Javanese rule. Ethnically and historically it formed a separate area for it was largely a Sundanese speaking region and enjoyed its own historical traditions. Javanese viewed it as a foreign kingdom. The fact that new foreigners, the Dutch, had established themselves there was not considered as incongruous: in Javanese terms they had merely inherited the sovereignty of previous Sundanese kings by virtue of their military conquests. See M. C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792* (Oxford, 1974), p. 410.
6. A(rsip) N(asional, Jakarta) 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 49, M. Waterloo to N. Engelhard, 5 Apr. 1805; AR d(e) K(ock private collection *aanwinsten* 1905), no. 145, M. Waterloo, 'Memorie van overgave', 4 Apr. 1808.
7. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. zo, J.G. van den Berg, 'Memorie op het Hof van Djocjocarta, onder den Sultan Hamengcoeboewana den Tweede . . . aan zijn Successeeur ...M. Waterloo', 11 Aug. 1803.
8. *Ibid.* p. 1.
9. Soekanto, *Sekitar Jogjakarta 1757-1825* (Djakarta, 1952), pp. 59-60; C. Poensen, 'Amāngku Buwānā II (Sěpuh)', *BKI*, lviii (1905), 126-30.
10. Poensen, p. 161; AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 22, G. W. Wiese to H. W. Daendels, 17 Apr. 1809, 23 May 1809, Wiese to J. A. van Braam, 30 June 1809.
11. S(ana) B(udaya library, Yogyakarta, MS.) A.135, *Babad Ngayogyakarta*, i, xz, 32-35, p. 160-1; Dwidjosoegondo (Tjantrik Mataram), *Peranan ramalan Djojobjo dalam*

revolusi kita (Bandung, 1966), pp. 51-52; G.W.J. Drewes, *Drie Javaansche Goeroe's* (Leiden, 1925), p. 136.

12. I(ndia) O(ffice) L(ibrary and Records, London) Eur. F 148/17, Pakubuwana IV to Lord Minto, 5 Ramėlan, A(nno) H(ijah) 1226 (23 Sept. 1811); Eur. F 148/18, Hamėngkubuwana II and Raja Putra Narendra to Lord Minto, 7 Ramėlan A.H. 1226 (25 Sept. 1811).
13. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 22, P. Engelhard to J.W. Janssens, 11 Sept. 1811.
14. J. Hageman J Cz., 'De Engelschen op Java', *T(ijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van het) B(ataviaasch) G(enootschap)*, vi (1856), 411-12, 415.
15. IOL, M(ackenzie) Pr(ivate collection) no. 21, p. 41-50, 'State of the Court of Djocjacarta by Mr Crawford', 6 Dec. 1811.
16. M. L. van Deventer (ed.), *Het Nederlandsch Gezag over Java en onderhoor igheden sedert 1817, vol. i: 1811-1820* ('s-Gravenhage, 1891), p. 314-19.
17. IOL, Eur. F 148/24, no. 13, T. S. Raffles to J. Crawford, 2 Apr. 1812.
18. L(eiden University library) Or(iental MS.) 2045, *Babad Bėdhah ing Ngayogyakarta*, VIII. 13-39, pp. 85-92.
19. IOL, Eur. F 148/24, H. Hope to T. S. Raffles, 2 Apr. 1813.
20. LOr 6791 (3), *Babad Spehi*, rv. 1, p. 151; Hageman, *ubi supra* p. 427.
21. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 29, J. Crawford to J. Dupuy, 20 Sept. 1814, R. C. Garnham to G. A. Addison, 11 Nov. 1814, mentioned 57 MSS. which had been taken out of the *kraton* and were claimed by the government; they were forwarded to Bogor; A(rchief) v(an) J(ojja, Rouffaer collection, Koninklijk Instituut western language MS. 698b) A. H. Smissaert to G. A. G. Ph. van der Capellen, 19 Apr. 1823 mentioned that all the land registers and lists had been taken from the *kraton*; some of these are in the British Museum, see M.C. Ricklefs, 'An Inventory of the Javanese Manuscript Collection in the British Museum', BKI, cxxv (1969), 255.
22. Hageman, *ubi supra* p. 427 estimated that Raffles took between 200,000 and 1,200,000 Spanish dollars in booty (1 Sp.d. = 3.20 guilders); AR v(an) A(lphen) E(ngelhard private collection, *aanwinsten* 1941) N. Engelhard, 'Vlugtig overzicht van Java in het einde van 1825' mentioned that Raffles took Sp.d. 450,000.
23. van Deventer, p. 323; the residents' courts were set up by Raffles's regulation of 11 Feb. 1814, see IOL G21/25, Java Public Consultations, 11 Feb. 1814.
24. IOL Eur. F 148/23, T. S. Raffles to Lord Minto, 6 Aug. 1812; Eur. F 148/24, id. to id., 18 Apr. 1813.
25. van Deventer, p. 333-5.
26. LOr 2045, xxv. 5-8, p. 251-2.
27. de Graaf, p. 225, p. 259.

28. K(oninklijk) I(nstituut voor) T(aal-) L(and- en) V(olkenkunde, Leiden), Or(ienta MS.) 13, Buku Kědhung Kěbo, m. 1-3, pp. gb-10a; LOr 6791 (3), vi. 9-11. p. 207.
29. AR MvK 4192, G(eheim en) K(abinets) A(rchief) no. 243k, 30 Oct. 1826, P. Ngabehi (Jayakusuma) to Sultan Sěpuh, 3 *mulud*, Jimakir A(nno) J(avanica) 1754 (xx Oct. 1826), P. Mangkubumi to Sultan Sěpuh, 7 *mulud*, Jimakir, A. J. 1754 (15 Oct. 1826); P. J. F. Louw, *De Java-Oorlog* (Batavia & 's-Hage, 1894), i. 685-7.
30. AR dK no. 183, H. MacGillavry to G. A. G. Ph. van det Capellen, 9 Aug. 1825 enclosing "Verklaring van Raden Mas Soewongso", 7 Aug. 1825; AR J. C. Baud private collection no. 177, W. van Hogendorp, 'Extract rapport betteffende de Residentie Kedoe' (1827); LOr 6547b, *Babad Dipanagara*, xxir. 36, p. 393; Graaf van Hogendorp, P. 143.
31. LOr 6547b, xrx. 2-3, p. 275.
32. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 29, R. C. Garnham, 'Statement of annual Expenditure in the Cratton by the late Sultan - Hamangkubuana the 3rd', 1 Dec. 1814; J. F. Walraven van Nes, "Verhandeling over de waarschijnlijke oorzaken die aanleiding tot de onlusten van 1825 en de volgende jaren in de Vorstenlanden gegeven hebben", *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch—Indië*, 6th series, iv (1844), 129-32.
33. F. de Haan, 'Personalia der periode van het Engelsch Bestuur over Java 1811~1816', BKI, xcii (1935), 529; LOr 2045, xxv. 5, p. 251; AR J. v(an den) B(osch private collection) no. 391, J. H. Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 2^o Luitt Knoerle ... betreffende de dagelyksche verkeerung van dien officier met... Diepo Negoro, gedurende eene reis van Batavia naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden ptins', p. 41 (henceforth Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen').
34. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 29, R. C. Garnham to Col. A. Adams, 3 Nov. 1814, id. to G. A. Addison, 8 Nov. 1814; Hageman, *ubi supra* pp. 441-2.
35. SB A. 144, *Babad Ngayogyakarta*, iii, LxI. 24-26, p. 367; LOr 6547b, xvir. 110-21, pp. 230-3; KITLV Or 13, 111. 69, p. 40; Hageman, *ubi supra* p. 430.
36. SB A. 136, *Babad Ngayogyakarta*, ii, x. 49-51, pp. 38-39; SB A. 144, Lx1. 22-26, p.367: AvJ p.93.
37. LOr 6547b, XIV. 92, p. 129, XV. 43-44, pp. 142-3, XVII. 2, p. 206, XXI. 93-94, p. 360; L.W.C. van den Berg, "De Mohammedaansche Geestelijkheid en de Geestelijke Goederen op Java en Madoera", *TBG*, xxvii (1882), 33-34.
38. Ricklefs, "Dipanagara's Early Inspirational Experience", *passim*.
39. AR vAE no. 28, remarks of A. H. Smissaert on the Resolution of the Minister of Marine and Colonies, 13 Oct. 1829, La H no. 90; E. S. de Klerck, *De Java-Oorlog*, v. 743.
40. See above, p. 59, n. 4.
41. LOr 6547b, xv. 8, p. 134, XVIII. I-93, pp. 243-63.
42. SB A. 135, XC. 27, p. 388.
43. LOr 6547b, XIX. 16-18, p. 280; Louw, i, 109-12.

44. KITLV Or 13, III. 69, p. 40; LOr 6547b, XVIII. 129-XIX. 15, pp. 271-9.
45. AR dK no. 23, J. van den Bosch to H. M. de Kock, 26 Mar. 1830; de Haan, *ubi supra* p. 620-1; Nahuys was married to a niece of J. R. Schimmelpenninck, Council Pensionary of Holland (1805-6).
46. P. H. van der Kemp, 'De Economische Oorzaken van den Java-Oorlog van 1825-30', BKI, 6th series, iii (1897) 16-38; Louw, i. 604-14.
47. Graaf van Hogendorp, p. 169; Anon., 'Journal of an excursion to the native provinces of Java in the year 1828 during the war with Diponegoro', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia* (Singapore), viii (1853), 18.
48. AR MvK 4207, GKA, 11 Oct. 1828 no. 208k, 'Pro Memorie van A. M. Th. de Salis over de Javasche Vorstenlanden', 8 May 1828; KITLV Or 13, 11. 30, p. 17; van Nes, *ubi supra* p. 164; there is a portrait of the fourth sultan dressed in this uniform in the *Yogya kraton*.
49. LOr 6547b, XVIII. 130-1, p. 271.
50. van Nes, *ubi supra* pp. 141-2.
51. KITLV H (ollands (western language) MS.) 696g, AvJ, pp. 75-79.
52. N(ahuy)s v(an) B(urgst private collection, University library, Leiden) 9.3, Nahuys van Burgst, 'Onlusten op Java', Feb. 1826; AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 52, A. H. Smisjaert to van der Capellen, 10 Sept. 1823, referred to the governor-general's decision of 11 Mar. 1818 providing 16 *ponden* (8 kgs) of gunpowder to Jhr. P. M. M. Bouwens van der Boyen to defend his estates at Kembang Arum.
53. Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (Kuala Lumpur, 1972), pp. 172 ff.
54. Day, p. 208, n. 1.
55. KITLV H 788, J. D. Boutet to L. Boutet, n.d. (?1821) visit to H. Thomson in Kědhu.
56. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 52, Nahuys van Burgst to Dir. of Finances, 31 Jan. 1822, id, to id., 10 May 1822; KITLV H 788, L. Boutet to J. D. Boutet, 14 May 1822; AR MvK 2776, B(esluit van den) G(ouverneur-) G(eneral) i(n) r(ade), 7 Mar. 1822, no. 34, 19 Mar. 1822, nos. 11-13, 2 Apr. 1822, no. 3, MvK 2464, BGG b(uiten) r(ade), 13 Feb. 1822, no. 9, 16 Feb. 1822, no. 10; NvB 9.3, Nahuys van Burgst, 'Onlusten op Java', Feb. 1826; LOr 6547b, XIX. 25-33, pp. 282-4.
57. AR MvK 2776, BGG ir, 7 Mar. 1822, no. 34.
58. IOL Eur. F 148/18, Translation of Gold Farm letter from Raja Putra Narendra to R. T. Rěksaněgara, 1 Sawal, Wawu, A. J. 1737 (30 Oct. 1811) gives the figure of Sp.d. 62,000 paid in two instalments at *mulud* and *puasa* for the rent of the sultan's farms in 1811. The figures for the tollgate returns to the government expressed in Java rupees (1 J.r. = 1.50 guilders) are as follows; 1812 (June-Dec.) 46,557; 1813, 99,220; 1814, 124,361; 1815, 147,818; 1816, 147,000 (approx.); 1817, 196,385; 1818, 224,190; 1819, 372,924; 1820, 331,052; 1821, 451,580; 1822, 479,052; 1823, 497,230; 1824 (1st 8 months) 511,320 (approx. for year 688,160), sources:

- AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 29, Capt. R. C. Garnham, 'Djocjocarta Toll Farms sold on 11th November 1814 for the years 1815, 1816, 1817'; NvB 5.11, Nahuys van Burgst, 'Rapport omtrent de Residentie Djocjocarta', 6 Feb. 1817; AR MvK 4132, H. MacGillavry, 'Nota omtrent den staat det Jvasche Vorstenlanden', 13 May 1826.
59. KITLV H 395, 'Rapport van den assistent-resident (P. F. H. Chevallier) over de werking der tolpoorten', May-June 1824.
 60. AR MvK 4132, MacGillavry, 'Nota'.
 61. KITLV H 395, Chevallier, 'Rapport'.
 62. *Ibid*,
 63. *Ibid.*; AR vAE (*aanwinsten* 1900) no. 283, H. MacGillavry to Dir. of Finances, 1 May 1825.
 64. M(useum) P(usat, Jakarta, Malay MS.) mu. 97, R.Adip. Jayadiningrat (ed. J. Hageman J Cz.) 'Schetsen over den Oorlog van Java, 1825-1830', p. 7, gave the daily rent for the gambling parlour in Yogya at J.r. 500-1,000; government revenue for opium sales in Yogyakarta rose from J.r. 132,000 in 1816, to J.r. 235,200 in 1822, NVB 5.2, Kruseman to commissioners-general, 26 Dec. 1816; AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 22, R. C. N. d'Abo to Dir. of Finances, 1 Feb. 1822.
 65. IOL MPr no, 21, 'Report upon the District of Cadoe (Kědhu) by Mr (John) Crawford', pp. 283-4.
 66. KITLV H 503, J. I. van Sevenhoven, 'Aanteekeningen gehouden op eene teis over Java van Batavia naar de Oosthoek in... 1812', pp. 49-54.
 67. AR MvK 4132, MacGillavry, 'Nota' gave the following figures (J.r.) for the value of goods stolen from the tollgates: 1817, 2,278; 1818, 3,005; 1819, 2,442; 1820, 4,240; 1821, 8,791; 1822, 15,623; 1823, 15,680; 1824 (1st 8 months) 21,739 (approx. for year: 32,100); Nahuys van Burgst pointed out that robberies on *bandars* usually took place at the end of *puasa* (fasting month) when Javanese had to render their taxes, NvB 5.2, Nahuys van Burgst to commissioners-general, 20 Aug. 1816.
 68. NvB 7.6, Nahuys van Burgst, 'Memorie van overgave voor den Resident Baron A. M. Th. de Salis', Surakarta, Apr. 1822, referring to the governor-general's decision of 14 Sept. 1817 no. 9; NvB 5.2, Kruseman to commissioners-general, 24 Dec. 1816, and see above, p. 58, n. 2.
 69. AR JvB no. 391, Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen', pp. 30-31.
 70. AR MvK 4132, MacGillavry, 'Nota'.
 71. AR MvK 4497, Geheim besluit van den G. G., 14 Dec. 1822, no. 1; KITLV Or 13 III. 59-64, pp. 38-39.
 72. van Nes, *ubi supra* p. 145; de Klerck, v. 744; J. Hageman J Cz., *Geschiedenis van de Oorlog op Java van 1825 tot 1830* (Batavia, 1856), pp. 29-30.
 73. KITLV Or 13, iv. 1-8, pp. 40-42; Wlidyā B(udaya, Yogyakarta *kraton* library MS.) A. 62, pp. 14-16, A. M. Th. de Salis to Dipanagara, Jan. 1823, Dipanagara to de Salis, Jan. 1823; vide LOr 8552a, pp. 320-1; LOr 6547b, XIX. 60-84, pp. 295-303.

74. LOr 6547b, XIX. 96-xx. 4, pp. 307-9; AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 52, R. C. N. d'Abo to commander of Klaten, 3 Jan. 1823, K(oninklijke) B(ibliotheek, The Hague) À. D. Cornets de Groot Jr. private collection IXe, pt. 4 pp. 44-45, A. D. Cornets de Groot Jr. to A. D. Cornets de Groot Sr., 31 Dec. 1822; P. B. R. Carey, 'The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteenth Century Java', Occasional Paper no. 24 (1974), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), p. 32.
75. AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven van den Heer Smissaert en Bylagen* (henceforth: 'Missiven Smissaert', van der Capellen to A. H. Smissaert, 4 Jan. 1823.
76. Louw, i. 47 n. 1; Graaf van Hogendorp, p. 146; de Klerck, v. 743; LOr 2114, *Babad Dipanagara* (Surakarta version), vir. 24, p. 27.
77. AR vAE (aanwinsten 1941), H. J. de Graaff to J. Fabius, 26 July 1823.
78. van der Kemp, *ubi supra* pp. 23-24.
79. *Ibid.* pp. 26 ff.; AR MvK 2778 BGG ir, 6 May 1823, no. 1, 20 May 1823, no. 1: *Staatsblad* (1823) no. 17.
80. van der Kemp, *ubi supra* pp. 30-31; van Nes, *ubi supra* p. 147, quoted part of Mangkubumi's statement for the full account see AR dK no. 161, van Nes, 'Korte Verhandeling over de waarschijnlijke oorzaken', 28 Jan. 1830.
81. van der Kemp, *ubi supra* p. 32.
82. van Nes, *ubi supra* p. 152.
83. Louw, i. 600-1; AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven Smissaert', H. MacGillavry, list of debts of Yogya citizens, 5 Oct. 1825.
84. MP Mt. 97, Jayadiningrat, 'Schetsen', p. 16; AR dK no. 165, 'Translaat-verhaal van Prins Adiwinto', n.d.
85. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 52, A. H. Smissaert to Mangkubumi and Dipanagara, 25 July 1823, éd. to Chevallier, 27 July 1823, id. to Nahuys van Burgst, 22 Sept. 1823; van Nes, *ubi supra* pp. 147-51.
86. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 54, Smissaert to Dir. of Finances, 21 Apr. 1824, van Nes, *ubi supra* pp. 151-2.
87. KITLV Or 13, rv. 79-80, p. 57; MP mr. 97, Jayadiningrat, 'Schetsen', p. 11; WB A. 62, pp. 78-79, Dipanagara to *ratu Agěng*, Sura, Dal, A. J. 1751 (Sept. 1823), *ratu Agěng* to Dipanagara, Sura, Dal, A. J. 1751 (Sept. 1823); SB A. 136, XL. 43-44, p. 169.
88. SB A. 136, XXXVIII. 19-24, PP. 1567.
89. FOOTNOTE MISSING IN ORIGINAL DOC.
90. AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven Smissaert', H. MacGillavry, list of debts, 5 Oct. 1825 Louw, i. 600; van Nes, *ubi supra* pp. 154-5.
91. van Nes, *ubi supra* p. 154. 1; AR vAE no. 28, Smissaert to King William I, n.d. (c. Sept. 1828), p. 47.
92. AR JvB no. 391, Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen', p. 41.

93. AR MvK 4497, Geheim besluit van den G. G. in rade, 9 Sept. 1823; KITLV H 696 f., stuk xv. pp. 415-25.
94. Graaf van Hogendorp, p. 145; AR MvK 4207, GKA, 11 Oct. 1828 no. 208k, de Salis, 'Pro Memorie'; AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven Smissaert', A. H. Smissaert to J. I. van Sevenhoven, 14 Dec. 1824; AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 52, Chevallier, 'Rapport', May-June 1824 on the back of which an official in Batavia had written: 'Mr Chevallier must become the Resident of Banyumas'.
95. AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven Smissaert', A. H. Smissaert to J. I. van Sevenhoven, 14 Dec. 1824.
96. AvJ, *haji* Alito Danurėja, 18 July 1825; KITLV Or 13, 1x. 12-13, p. 89; AR dK no. 183, 'Verklaring van Raden Mas Soewongso', 7 Aug. 1825.
97. AR MvK 4194, GKA, 13 Mar. 1827, Litt. 31 no. 34, Anon. to Sultan Sěpuh, n.d.
98. AvJ, p. cvi, A. H. Smissaert to Danurėja, 24 May 1825.
99. LOr 2114, 11. 1-11. 25, pp. 5-12; LOr 6547b, xx. 78-xxl. 15, pp. 338-43.
100. NvB 9.2, H. MacGillavry to A. H. Smissaert, 16 July 1825; H. F. Aukes, *Het Legioen van Mangkoe Nagoro* (Bandung, 1935), p. 62.
101. LOr 6547b, XXI. I47-XXII. IO, pp. 373-6; SB A. I36, L. I-3, pp. 2II-I2; KITLV Or I3, x. I-4, p. I03; LOr 2II4, VIII. i-x. 6, pp. 28-40.
102. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 53, A. H. Smissaert to Algemeen Secretaris, II Jan. 1825; AR dK no. 182, P. le Clercq to van der Capellen, 29 July 1825.
103. AR dK no. 182, Breton van Groll to van der Capellen, 28 July 1825, P. le Clercq (Res. of Kedhu) to H. M. de Kock, 29 July 1825.
104. LOr 2114, x. 28-30, p. 43; Louw, 1. 361-93.
105. AR dK no. 183, H. MacGillavry to H. M. de Kock, 28 July 1825, 2.30 a.m.; AR dK no. 95, Nahuys van Burgst to de Kock, 2 Sept. 1828, de Kock to Nahuys van Burgst, 4 Sept. 1828; Louw, i. 275-6.
106. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. 54, A. H. Smissaert to H. MacGillavry, 29 July 1825, id. to commander of Yogya, I 3 Aug. 1825; AR dK no. 183, H. MacGillavry to van der Capellen, 11 Aug. 1825, enclosing the report of Wörmer, deputy inspector of cultures in Pacitan.
107. AR dK no. 183, A. D. Cornets de Groot Jr. to van der Capellen, 26 Sept. 1825.
108. AR dK no. 158, "Naamlijsten van Djokjosche hoofden, die aan het Nederlandsch gezag zijn getrouw gebleven of de partij van Diepo Negoro houden of zich weder aan ons gezag hebben onderworpen", Mar.—Dec. 1829.
109. AN 'Djokjo Brieven' no. zo, van den Berg, 'Memorie' (1803); LOr 2045, XXV. 6-8, pp. 251-2; AR MvK 4132, Lawick van Pabst, 'Consideratiën op de Nota van den Heer MacGillavry', 21 Aug. 1826; AR JvB no. 391, Knoerle, 'Aanteekeningen', p. 21.

110. KITLV H 76, 'Papieren (Javaansche): boedel van (sultan) Hamengkoe Boewana IV', pt. 2.
111. *Ibid.*; AR MvK 4132, 'Missiven Smissaert', Mas Ng. Wiraprana to Danurĕja, 15 July 1825; AR dK 183, H. MacGillavry to H. M. de Kock, 28 July 1825 enclosing a *piagĕm* (letter of authority) dated Bĕsar, A. J. 1752 (July-Aug. 1825) from Dipanagara recognizing Mas Ng. Angawicana as head of all the *kecus* (robbers) in the Yogya area.
112. A. S. H. Booms, *Eenige bladzijden uit de Nederlands Indische krijgsgeschiedenis 1820~1840* (Amsterdam, 1911), p. 34; Carey, 'Cultural Ecology', p. 35.
113. Carey, *supra* pp. 27-33, PP- 42-43.
114. *Ibid.*; G. W. J. Drewes, *supra* pp. 164-8.
115. Carey, *supra* pp. 18-23.
116. LOr 2168, no. 11, p. 5, Mangkubumi and Dipanagara to de Kock, n.d. (?23 Aug. 1825).
117. Carey, 'Javanese Histories', pp. 285-8.
118. Drewes, *supra* pp. 134-5, pp. 168 ff.
119. Carey, 'Cultural Ecology', pp. 31-33.
120. Carey, *supra*, pp. 12-16, pp. 44-46, pp. 47-50.
121. KITLV H 263, P. D. Portier, 'Verklaring ...houdende een verhaal van zijn gevangenschap bij de muitelingen', Surakarta, n.d. (?1827), p. 12; KITLV H 340, H. M. de Kock, 'Verslag van het voorgevallene met den *pangeran* Dipo-Nagoro, kort vóór, bij en na zijne overkomst', Magĕlang, 1 Apr. 1830, entry of 8 Mar. 1830 mentioned that Dipanagara spoke to all Dutchmen, especially the resident of Kĕdhu, in *ngoko* (Low Javanese).
122. de Klerck, v. 742.
123. KITLV H 340, entry of 8 Mar. 1830 and 28 Mar. 1830; Carey, 'Javanese Histories', pp. 285-8.